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Olivier Guéant, Roger Guesnerie, Jean-Michel Lasry
October 28th, 2009
Abstract
This article discusses the discount rate to be used in projects that
aimed at improving the environment. The model has two di¤erent goods,
one is the usual consumption good whose production may increase ex-
ponentially, the other is an environmental good whose quality remains
limited. The stylized world we describe is fully determined by four pa-
rameters, reecting basic preferences "ecological" and intergenerational
concerns and feasibility constraints.
We dene an ecological discount rate and examine its connections with
the usual interest rate and the optimized growth rate. We discuss, in this
simple world, a variety of forms of the precautionary principle.
Résumé
Cet article discute des taux dactualisation à utiliser pour lévaluation
de projets visant à améliorer lenvironnement à long terme. Il y a deux
biens dans le modèle, un bien privé susceptible dêtre multiplié de façon
exponentielle, un bien environnemental,disponible en quantités limitées.
Nous décrivons un monde stylisé dans lequel quatre paramètres reètent
les préférences entre les consommations, les considérations déquité inter-
générationnelle et les contraintes de faisabilité. Nous dénissons un taux
dactualisation écologique et le comparons avec les taux dintérêt habituels
et les taux de croissance. Nous discutons, dans ce monde simplié toute
une série de formes du principe de précaution.
We thank for useful comments on a previous version Ivar Ekeland, Vincent Fardeau,
Thomas Piketty, Bertrand Villeneuve and Martin Weitzman. We also acknowledge useful
exchange on this subject with Gary Becker, Steve Murphy and Joseph Stiglitz.
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1 Introduction
Environmentalists have often dismissed the economists approach of environ-
mental problems, more especially when long term issues are at stake. On the
one hand, what may be called ecological intuitionputs high priority on the
long run preservation of the environment. On the other hand, the cost-benet
analysis promoted from economic reasoning calls for the use of discount rates
that apparently lead to dismiss the long run concerns. The climate issue is the
most recent avatar of the clash between ecological intution and economic
reason: in sharp contrast with most environmentalists and many climatolo-
gists sensitivity, the computations based on Nordhaus (1993) suggest lenient
climate policies. And although Nordhaus has made cautious warning, some of
his less cautious readers (Lomborg (2001)) claim that their ght against climate
policies proceeds from economic reason. Although the Stern review (2006)
has changed the tone of the debate, it is clear that Sterns views of economic
reasonand of the subsequent cost-benet analysis, is not broadly accepted in
the profession.
The present paper attempts to retackle the clear antagonism between the two
sides from a simple model, that has been recurrently evoked in the economists
debate, (see Krautkramer (1987), Heal, (1998)) but the relevance of which in
the present debate has been recently more systematically stressed by Guesnerie
(2004) and Hoel and Sterner (2007) and Sterner and Persson (2007). The model
assumes that there are two goods at each period: the environment, a non-market
good available in nite quantity and standard aggregate consumption, which is
allowed to grow for ever. The opposition between a nite level of environmental
good and an increasing level of consumption good echoes a core determinant of
the ecologicalsensitivity: sites, lands, seashores, species are nitely available
on the planet. On the contrary, modern optimism, based on the economics
of past growth performance, leads to believe that consumption of the so-called
private goods may be multiplied without limit.
We discuss the long run cost-benet analysis issues that arise within a model,
that has indeed two goods, the two goods being associated with aggregate con-
sumption and aggregate environmental quality. As emphasized in Guesnerie
(2004), in such a setting, cost-benet analysis has to stress, not only the stan-
dard discount rates but also, the ecological discount rate, the evolution of
which reects the relative price of environment vis à vis the standard private
good1 . The simple innite horizon world under scrutiny is entirely described by
four parameters.
The rst parameter describes how substitutable are the standard and envi-
ronmental good in producing welfare. Opinions on the value of this parameter
may di¤er and lead to oppose a moderate environmentalist and a radical
environmentalist. The second parameter is the classical elasticity of marginal
utility which allows to assess the extent to which welfare is subject to satiety,
1 It is well known that in an n-commodity world, there are as many discount rates as there
are goods (see Malinvaud (1953); for a general appraisal of this question)
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and which classically determines the intertemporal "resistance to substitution",
or in a risky context, "relative risk-aversion".The third parameter is a pure
rate of time preference which, in this setting measures, the degree of intergener-
ational altruism of the agents. The last parameter is an interest rate which in the
logic of a simple endogenous growth context (of the AK type) indicates to which
extent one can transfer consumption between periods and generations. It is here
a su¢ cient statistics for describing the intertemporal production possibilities. .
Within this model, the research agenda is most clear: we have to under-
stand how the various parameters under consideration a¤ect the trade-o¤ be-
tween present and future consumption, whether it is standard or "environmen-
tal" consumption. In the latter case, the trade-o¤ is reected in the "ecological"
discount rates supporting the optimal policy: its values allow to stress in a some-
what synthetical way, the di¤erence between the moderateand the radical
ecological viewpoints.
The paper proceeds as follows.
Part 1 of the paper presents the basic model, but abstract from the "feasi-
bility" constraints, by putting emphasis on an exogenous growth path of private
consumption: it adopts the "reform viewpoint" which provides a good introduc-
tion to the optimization approach of Part 2.
Part 2 indeed characterizes the optimal growth policy under the assumption
that environmental quality remains constant over time. The analysis allows to
derive both the time pattern of optimal growth rates of private consumption and
of the "ecological discount rates". It leads to put emphasis on di¤erent "yield"
curves.
Part 3 attempts to answer a number of questions relating with the so-called
precautionary principle: how much should the present generation be willing to
pay to avoid an irreversible damage to the environment that will take place soon
or on the contrary at some later date ? The question makes sense in a deter-
ministic context where the nature and extent of the damage is well ascertained
ex-ante. When the scientic evidence is lacking, the damage has to be viewed as
uncertain: such an uncertainty, that will be ex-post truly revealed, is reected
here in di¤erent ex-ante evaluations of the environmental concern made by the
moderate and the radical environmentalist. We stress three versions of the extent
of "precaution" imbedded into our analysis. The rst one stresses the maximal
willingness to pay of a society for avoiding a deterministic irreversible damage.
When damages to-day are truly uncertain, we stress rst a "weak precaution-
ary principle", which is reminiscent when "ecological" discount rates matter of
Weitzmans classical argument (2001) on long run standard discount rates, and,
second and nally, a strong "precautionary" principle, which we view as the
most striking result of this paper.
The connections of the paper with the literature are as follows. Models with
two-goods include Heal (1998). The model of the paper is the one considered in
Guesnerie (2004), and the argument exploits the ndings of this paper. It also
uses some of the insights of Hoel-Sterner (2007) and Persson-Sterner (2007), who
have examined the same model and, mainly in Part 2, some further insights of
Guéant-Lasry-Zerbib (2007). All these papers refer to the concept of ecological
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discount rates emphasized in Guesnerie (2004), a concept that has also been
stressed in a somewhat more complex setting than ours, and with a di¤erent
focus, by Gollier (2008). Note also that the importance of substitutability,
which we emphasize here, has been stressed earlier in Neumayer (2002) and
Gerlagh-Van der Zwann (2002).
Note that the views presented here on discounting and precaution have a
motivation closely connected to the one of Weitzman (2009). However our
emphasis is on relative prices e¤ects: even if we put emphasis on the uncertainty
that surrounds the long run environmental issues and on the weight to be put
on the bad case, we do not stress "fat tails".
Part I
Model and preliminary insights.
1.1 Goods and Preferences.
We are considering a world with two goods. Each of them has to be viewed as
an aggregate. The rst one is the standard aggregate private consumption of
growth models. The second one is called the environmental good. Its quantity
provides an aggregate measure of environmental quality at a given time. It
may be viewed as an index reecting biodiversity, the quality of landscapes,
nature and recreational spaces, the quality of climate, the availability of water2 .
We call xt the quantity of private goods available at period t, and yt the
level of environmental quality at the same period. Generation t, that lives at
period t only, has ordinal preferences, represented by a concave, homogenous of
degree one utility function:
v(xt; yt) =
h
x
 1

t + y
 1

t
i 
 1
However, the measurement of cardinal utility, on which intertemporal judge-
ments of welfare will be made, involves an iso-elastic function.
V (xt; yt) =
1
1  0 v(xt; yt)
1 0
The above modelling calls for the following comments that concern respec-
tively v and V:
 Concerning v; we have to stress several points, the rst two ones concerning
the symmetry of the model.
2As we shall do in a companion paper later, we may view it, in a broader way, as integrating
many non-markets dimensions of welfare, for example the non-market costs of migrations,
health problems relating to climate change.
4
The reader has noted that both xt and yt appear with the same coe¢ cient
in the function v. However this is without loss of generality for exam-
ple as soon as we keep control of the freedom in the measurement3
of yt.
Giving the same weight to the private good index and to the environ-
mental quality index is a matter of notational convenience. However,
leaving this weight constant across time, and in fact, what matters
non vanishing, is a substantive assumption. It implies in particu-
lar that the concern for environmental goods does not shrink, as it
would in a world where all private and environmental goods would
be symmetric and where the number of private goods would increase
indenitely. The present assumption on the symmetric role of x and
y is intended to reect the fact that we only have one planet, the
preservation of which is not, and will never be, a point of minor
concern for its inhabitants, whatever their ability to produce large
quantities of new private goods. Even, if the specic modelling is
crude, this point seems well taken for our purpose in the sense that
we do not deny a priori the soundness of ecological intuition.
A CES utility function, where  is the elasticity of substitution, describes
a specic pattern of substitution, which is special but easy to grasp.
As the reader will easily check, a key insight into the present formula-
tion is the following: the marginal willingness to pay - in terms of the
private good - for the environmental good is (@2V )=(@1V ) = (x=y)1=.
This can be viewed as the implicit price of the environmental good.
When the ratio environmental quantity (here quality) over private
good quantity decreases by one per cent the marginal willingness to
pay for the environmental good, or its implicit price, increases by
( 1=) per cent. Equivalently, looking at compensated choices, i.e.
substitution along an indi¤erence curve we see that when the ratio
of the (implicit) price of the environmental good over price of the
private good decreases by one per cent, then the ratio quantity (here
quality) of the environmental good over quantity of the private good
increases by  per cent. It follows that if, as we often suppose in
the following, environmental quality is constant and equals y; and
the private good consumption increases at the rate g; then the mar-
ginal willingness to pay for the environmental good increases at the
rate (g=); which is greater (resp. smaller) than g; if  is smaller
(resp. greater) than one. Let us remember also that existing studies
3 Indeed, as we shall see later, one can dene at each period a green GDP, (the product
of the implicit price of the environmental good by its quantity) and the standard GDP, (the
product of the quantity of private goods by its price). The ratio of green GDP over the standard
GDP is indeed, see below, ( yt
xt
)1 
1
 , and, once we know , we may calibrate the model, i.e.
choose the units of measurement of the environmental good by assessing the relative value
of green GDP at the rst period. This analysis would however have to be qualied in the
limit Cobb-Douglas case ( = 1) where the share of green GDP vis à vis standard GDP does
depend on the coe¢ cient of the Cobb-Douglas function.)
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on environment often suggest that it is a luxurygood in the sense
that the marginal willingness to pay increases more than wealth or
income. Now, the number y

x
y
 1

may be called the greenGDP:
note that it grows indenitely whenever x grows indenitely, if, as
we suppose here, y remains nite. Note also that the ratio of green
GDP over standard GDP is  =
 
y
x
1  1 and the ratio of green GDP
to total GDP is:  = 1+ .
 Let us come to V . The marginal utility of a utilof v, takes the form v 0 :
when v increases by one per cent, marginal cardinal utility decreases by 0
per cent. This is the standard coe¢ cient linked to intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ( 10 ), relative risk aversion (
0) or intertemporal resistance
to substitution.
1.2 Social welfare
Social welfare is evaluated as the sum of generational utilities. In line with the
argument of Koopmans, we adopt the standard utilitarian criterion:
1
1  0
+1X
t=0
e tv(xt; yt)1 
0
Two comments can be made:
 The coe¢ cient  is a pure rate of time preference. Within the normative
viewpoint which we mainly stress here, the fact that this coe¢ cient is pos-
itive has been criticized, for example by Ramsey who claims that this is
ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagina-
tionor Harrod (1948) who views that as a polite expression for rapacity
and the conquest of reason by passion. Reconciling these feelings with
Koopmansargument4 leads however to accept a positive and small , the
smaller, the more ethical considerations become preponderant: along
the "ethical" line of argument, it has been argued that the number might
be viewed as the probability of survival of the planet5 .
 We may view the coe¢ cient 0, as a purely descriptive one, reecting
intertemporal and risk behavior, or as a partly normative coe¢ cient, re-
ecting the desirability of income redistribution across generations. This is
the more frequent interpretation we stress in the paper: a low (resp. high)
0 reects little (resp. a lot of) concern for intergenerational equality.
4Overtakingwould be another, di¤erent, way to proceed.
5This argument is more satisfactory when we model adequately the uncertainty of the
problem. Within a deterministic framework, a higher  may sometimes be a proxy for the
inappropriate treatment of uncertainty.
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At this stage, something more can be said on the philosophy of the approach
taken here.
We have adopted a stylized description of the trade-o¤ between environmen-
tal quality and private consumption. We recognize that the modelling of the
trade-o¤, (depending at every period on a single parameter, and more impor-
tantly, the same across time), is crude. However if the degree of substitutability
between standard consumption good and environment is xed, we leave its value
open. At this stage, we do not decide whether  is smaller, a plausible short run
hypothesis6 , or greater than one, and we leave it xed. We associate a high ,
(resp. low ) to a moderate, (resp. radical) environmentalists viewpoint, the
dividing line being obviously  = 1.
At this stage, one should give some insights on the qualitative di¤erences
between the cases  > 1 and  < 1, i.e. between the opinions we attribute
respectively to the moderateand the radicalenvironmentalists. These dif-
ferences echo the views that shape the understanding of the future long run
usefulness of environmental quality when compared to private consumption.
We have:
v(xt; yt) = xt[1 + (
yt
xt
)(
 1
 )](

 1 )
First, let us consider  > 17 . Now, v grows as xt whenever
yt
xt
tends to zero
and social marginal utility of consumption will decrease at 0 times the growth
rate of v, which is the growth rate of consumption. The asymptotic relative
contribution of environment to welfare is vanishing and similarly, the Green
GDP becomes small when compared to standard GDP. As we shall see later
recurrently, the moderate environmentalist is very moderate in the long run.
On the contrary, in the case where  < 18 , it is useful to write:
v(xt; yt) = yt[1 + (
yt
xt
)(
1 
 )](

 1 )
In that case, (reminding that  1 < 0), v does not grow any longer indef-
initely with xt, but tends to y. Then, social marginal utility of consumption
tends to zero as x 1=(y1= 
0
) that is at a speed independent of 0. The in-
crease in the consumption of private goods still contributes to welfare but with
an asymptotic limit associated with the level of environmental quality. Stan-
dard GDP becomes small with respect to Green GDP.
6Since, again, the marginal willingness for environmental amenities seems to grow faster
than private wealth. (see Krutilla J. Cichetti C. (1972))
7For example, with  = 2
v(xt; yt) = xt[1 + (
yt
xt
)(1=2)]2
8For  = 1=2,
v(xt; yt) = yt[1 + (
yt
xt
)]( 1)
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We will argue later that the problem under scrutiny is dominated by uncertainty,
and that such an uncertainty is decisively reected in our framework through
what is, in our stylized framework, the summary statistics of the desirability
of a good environment, i.e. the parameter . At this stage, we focus attention
on the deterministic cases and emphasize the di¤erences. First, it is useful to
search for some intuition of the argument, by understanding what goes on at
the margin of some economic trajectory. We shall then look at the intertemporal
social optimum in a most elementary endogenous growth model.
2 Preliminaries: Investigation around a simple
reference trajectory.
2.1 The reference trajectory, rst denitions and insights.
In order to give some intuition on the question of discount rates, we shall con-
sider a reference trajectory of the economy where environmental quality is xed
at the level y and where the sequence of private goods consumption denoted xt
is also given (we often assume that the growth rate g of consumption is itself
xed). Note that our formulation, at least at this stage, does not assume either
limits to growthdue to the nite ecological resources nor even deterioration
of the ecological production due to growth.
The question we examine is: what are the discount rates, standard interest
rate for private goods, i.e. the return to private capital rt, and what we call the
ecological rate for environmental goods implicit to the xed trajectory ?
We shall rst investigate the implicit discount factors at the margin of our
reference trajectory, with xed environmental quality and exponential growth.
We sometimes refer to this approach as the reform viewpoint. In the next
section, we shall then take the optimization viewpoint and stress connections
between the present reference trajectory and a socially optimal trajectory.
The reference trajectory  has consumption growing at the rate gt (by de-
nition xt+1 = e
gt xt ) and the environmental quality equal to y.
We want to compute the implicit discount rates that sustain this trajectory,
that is the discount rates that make it locally optimal.
Denition 1 The implicit discount rate for private good between periods t and
t+ 1, is rt such that
e r

t = e 
@1V (xt+1; y)
@1V (xt; y)
where @1V (x; y) =
h
x
 1
 + y
 1

i( 1 0 1 )
x 
1
 :
The discount rate between periods 0 and T is then classically dened as :
R(T ) =
1
T
T 1X
t=0
rt
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The discount rate R(T ) tells us, as is standard, that one unit of consumption
at period t, is (socially) equivalent to e TR
(T ) today.
We introduce the ecological discount rate, which as stressed in Guesnerie
(2004), is the discount rate specic to the commodity environment9 .
Denition 2 The ecological implicit discount rate between two consecutive pe-
riods is t dened by:
e 

t = e 
@2V (xt+1; y)
@2V (xt; y)
The discount rate between periods 0 and T is:
B(T ) =
1
T
T 1X
t=0
t
The ecological discount rate tells us that one marginal improvement of en-
vironment today is socially equivalent to e TB
(T ) of the same improvement
occurring at period T . It implies that the present generation, when viewing an
improvement of environment occurring at period T , (improvement supposed, for
example, to be triggered by some present spending), should compare the present
cost with the discounted value, (discounted with the ecological discount rate), of
the present marginal willingness to pay for the same improvement today. (This
is what is called standardecological cost-benet analysis by Guesnerie (2004)).
In other words, the cut-o¤ maximal cost that the society is willing to incur for
a unit improvement of the environmental quality at period T , i.e. e TB
(T )C(0)
where C(0) is the willingness to pay of the present generation (indeed here,
(y(0)=x(0)) 1=) for the same unit environmental improvement.
2.2 Implicit discount rates along the reference trajectory.
We can now provide explicit formulas for our implicit discount rates along the
reference trajectory that has been introduced.
Proposition 3 Along our reference trajectory, x0; : : : ; x

t+1 = e
gt xt ; : : :
 the implicit private discount rate for the private good between periods t
and t+ 1 can be equivalently written as,
either:
rt =  + g

t 
0 + 1 
0
 1 ln

1+t
1+t+1

or rt =  + g

t = +
1 0
 1 ln

1+t
 1
1+t+1
 1

where t =
yt@2V
xt@1V
=

xt
yt
 1
 1
is
the ratio of Green GDP over standard GDP.
9Hoel-Sterner(2006) consider the same model as here or as in Guesnerie (2004), without
referring explicitly to the "ecological discount rate".
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 The ecological discount rate between periods t and t+ 1 is:
t = r

t   gt =
The rst formula shows how the standard logic of discount rates (rt =
 + gt 
0) is a¤ected by the environmental concern. The correction depends on
ratios that depend upon t, a coe¢ cient that may be viewed as the ratio of Green
GDP over standard GDP and t is its value along the trajectory. The second
formula looks strikingly di¤erent from the rst one, although it is equivalent,
but it puts emphasis on factors that become dominant in one of the case under
scrutiny later.
Indeed, one can get a more informative and balanced view of the two rst
formulas, by taking a rst order approximation, (justied if the time period is
small) of the expression rt =  + g

t 
0 + 1 
0
 1 ln

1+t
1+t+1

.
Corollary 4 A rst order approximation of the preceding formula is: rt '
 + gt (
1
1+t
0 + 

t
1+t
1
 )
A similar formula was indeed stressed by Hoel and Sterner (2006) who con-
sidered the continuous time version of the model10 .
The third formula stresses the e¤ect of the growth of private consumption on
the ecological discount rate: it is qualitatively unsurprising that it is connected
to the standard discount rate with a negative correction that increases with the
growth rate and decreases when the elasticity of substitution increases. This
formula, which captures the relative price e¤ect that we are stressing here is
particularly simple and intuitively appealing. We can think about it as follows:
it would be equivalent to give up one unit of environmental quality at the present
period t, in order to provide et of environmental quality tomorrow, but the
suggested move is equivalent, from the view point of both generations, to give
up C(t) units of private goods and to provide C(t)ert units, as soon as C(t)ert
compensate for one unit of environmental quality at time t+1, which is the case,
if and only if C(t)ert = C(t+ 1)et = C(t)egt=et . The conclusion follows and
stresses a key ingredient for the understanding of the argument of the present
paper.
The dynamics of the implicit discount rates stressed above is related to the
dynamics of the growth rates. We will not examine this question comprehen-
sively here, but will only focus it on the long run behavior of the discount rates,
under the assumption that the average growth rate of consumption converges:
1
T
PT 1
t=0 g

t ! g.11
10Recently Gollier(2008) has derived generalizations of these formulas to general utility
functions with uncertainties on g and y, in a similar world with two goods.
11Standard optimization à la Ramsey-Solow, with exogenous technical progress, does not
necessarily lead to an asymptotic growth rate. (for a review on these issues, see Guesnerie-
Woodford (1992)). We reconsider this problem in the special endogenous growth model that
will be studied from the next Section.
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We focus our attention on the long run discount rate for private good, i.e.
the limit of the discount rate between periods 0 and T , R(T ) = 1T
PT 1
t=0 r

t ,
when T becomes high. Similarly, the long run ecological discount rate is the
limit, when T increases indenitely of B(T ) = 1T
PT 1
t=0 

t :
The next result, again a corollary of Proposition 3, stresses the spectacu-
lar di¤erences in the behavior of long run discount rates, according to whether
 > 1 or  < 1
Corollary 5 At the margin of the reference situation, when T tends to +1,
- When  > 1,
R(T )!  + g0 and B(T )!  + g(0   1=)
- When  < 1,
R(T )!  + g= and B(T )! 
This proposition, stressed in Guesnerie (2004) provides a useful introductory
key in the the problem. Here are some comments:
 In the rst case ( > 1), the traditional case in the sense that the two goods
are good substitutes, standard considerations matter for the standard long
run discount rate, while however, the limit value of the ecological discount
rate is signicantly below the value of the standard discount rate (the
di¤erence is given by  g=).
 The second case ( < 1) is characterized by a low substituability between
the private good and the environmental good. For the reasons analyzed
above, the qualitative logic underlying the standard discount rate is en-
tirely changed and the value of the asymptotic ecological discount rate
only depends on  and not on the growth path.12
The result suggests strong asymptotic discontinuity between the cases  < 1
and  > 1 when the same rate of growth of consumption is inserted in the
formulas. In a sense this is not surprising since it has been known for long
that CES modelling involves a discontinuity when the elasticity of substitution
goes through 1 (see Arrow-Chenery-Solow (1961)). Indeed, this result does not
depend on our assumption of time stability of ;but on its asymptotic limit, as
shown by the next proposition.
Proposition 6 If limt!+1 t =  6= 1 then, at the margin of the reference
situation, when T tends to +1, the above asymptotic results on discount rates
do depend on  > 1 and  < 1 in an unmodied way. The case where t ! 1 is
undetermined and depends, among other things, on the convergence speed.
12A long run value of  < 1, means that the environmental issues become preponderant in
the long run: indeed the situation was characterized by ecological strangling in Guesnerie
(2004)).
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We shall come back below, in Section 2-1, on the economic signicance of
the discontinuity13 .
At this stage, it should however be stressed that the exact relevance of the
comparative statics analysis of the long run discount rates is unclear. It goes
without saying, for example, that there is a priori no reason to refer to the
same growth rate of consumption under di¤erent assumptions on , since these
assumptions reect di¤erent views, (moderate or radical) of the contribution
of the environment to welfare, and then potentially very di¤erent views on
desirable growth. In the next section, we will indeed leave these di¤erent views
be reected in di¤erent choices of growth rates of consumption.
Part II
Optimized growth: the evolution
of private consumption and of
"ecological" discount rates.
The above results hold at the margin of any trajectory, whether it is non-optimal,
or optimal either in a rst best sense or in a second best sense. However, as just
argued the a priori drastic disagreements on the relative contribution of the
private consumption and environmental consumption, involved in the choice
of , makes unclear how di¤erent the choices of consumption trajectories will
be a¤ected by , so that the reform assessment of the di¤erences may be
misleading.
To go further, we stick to the option of a xed environmental quality, but
put emphasis on the endogeneity of private consumption: we then compare
choices in general and ecological discount rates, in particular, not from arbitrary
growth trajectories but from optimized trajectories. We choose the simplistic
endogenous setting of the AK type, where the interest rate r is exogenous,
being then a one-dimensional su¢ cient statistics of the intertemporal production
possibilities14 . Hence, as announced in the introduction, our discussion within
the model will focus on four parameters only, one associated with the ecological
concern, , a second one with a standard dimension of preferences 0, the third
one  with "ethical" considerations and the last one r with economic constraints:
13Now, let us furthermore note that the case  = 1 is neither the limit of  < 1 nor of
 > 1. Indeed, one proves that, if  = 1, at the margin of the reference situation, when T
tends to +1, R(T )!  + 1
2
g(0 + 1) and B(T )!  + 1
2
g(0   1).
14Note that such an interest rate r can be extracted from a research arbitrage equation (as
in Aghion-Howitt (1998)), partly disconnected from the core model
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3 The model and characterization of the social
optimum.
3.1 Characterization results.
Our viewpoint is normative, and we refer to the intertemporal social welfare
function introduced above. The social Plannermaximizes:
1X
t=0
e tV (xt; yt)
Our modelling choice of the AK type leads to consider the following economic
and environmental constraints:
Economic constraints: t+1 = er(t   xt) where t stands for the wealth
at date t 15 .
Environmental constraints: The environmental quality is limited to y that
is: yt  y:
We naturally assume that r > : Furthermore, in this model, it is easy to check
that optimization would lead to an innite postponement of consumption
if r(1   0) > . We rule this out and assume that 0 > 1   (=r). This
means, given the order of magnitude that we have in mind, that we will
consider that 0 is essentially greater than 1.
The next proposition gathers all the asymptotic results of social optimiza-
tion. The rst part stresses that optimality requires asymptotically constant
growth whatever the parameters under scrutiny. However, both the asymptotic
economic growth rates and the long run ecological discount rates crucially de-
pends on the value of  and 0:
Proposition 7 - At the optimum, the private goods consumption grows asymp-
totically, whatever ; 0.
- The optimal asymptotic growth rate for the private good xt depends on 
and is given by the following formulae:
- If  < 1 then g1 = (r   ) .
- If  > 1 then g1 =
r 
0
16
15A slightly more sophisticated version allows t+1 = exp(r)[t xt+wt], where t stands
for the wealth at date t and wt is a possible exogenous production ow that introduces no
binding constraint into the analysis.
16The case  = 1 is specic and then g1 =
2(r )
1+0 .
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- The asymptotic ecological discount rate, associated with the socially optimal
trajectory is B1 = limT!+1B
(T ) given by the following formulae17 :
- If  < 1 then B1 = .
- If  > 1 then B1 = (1  10 )r + 10 .
The proof is in the appendix: once the regular asymptotic behavior of the
growth rates is established, the results can be obtained from the formulas derives
in the preceding section. Let us comment on the key insights.
The rst one refers to the standard intuition as soon as  > 1. The as-
ymptotic growth rate of consumption is r 0 , tting the standard formula of the
one-good model: the presence of the environmental good is asymptotically irrel-
evant (although it is relevant on the optimal trajectory). The result for the other
case ( < 1) may be surprising for two reasons: rst, it was, a priori, unclear
that the radicalenvironmentalist would choose a positive asymptotic growth.
The second point is more surprising: under the assumption that 0 > 1, even
if the asymptotic growth rate chosen by the radical environmentalist relates in
an expected way with the preference for the environmental good (it decreases
when  gets lower), it is still greater than the one chosen by the moderate en-
vironmentalist. Note however that the conclusion will be easily reversed once
we suppose, as it is clearly the case, that growth may a¤ect negatively environ-
mental quality. The reader will nd the intuition of both facts by returning to
the above explanation of the long run di¤erences of views between the radical
and the moderateenvironmentalist.
Nevertheless, the opposition between the radicalenvironmentalist and the
moderateone remains clearly stressed through the behavior of the ecological
discount rate. The asymptotic di¤erence is again spectacular, as shown if we
plot the asymptotic ecological interest rate as a function of :
17 If  = 1 then B1 =    1 
0
1+0 (r   ).
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Figure 1: Dependence on  of the variable B1 when 
0 = 2
Again the asymptotic results stress a discontinuity in the world around  =
1: However, this discontinuity may be seriously qualied.
Proposition 8 At each period T, the optimal trajectory, is a continuous func-
tion of the parameters ; 0:
In a sense, the discontinuity associated with  = 1 is worrying and might be
viewed as an objection18 to our (admittedly crude) modelling choice. The above
continuity result, which says that at a given period results are continuous func-
tions of , weakens the objection: the discontinuity in the limitis compatible
with continuity at the limit: indeed B(T ) is a continuous function of  when
T is xed (and nite), as stated in a Corollary.
Corollary 9 8T <1;  7! B(T ;) is continuous.
All these results suggest to put the emphasis on the trajectory and to stress
the time paths of discount rates. This will be done later but lets rst concentrate
on a variant of the model in which the environmental quality decreases instead
of being constant.
3.2 The case of environmental good exhaustion
We have stressed the polar case of xed environmental quality. The opposite po-
lar case is the exhaustion of the environmental good at a rate g0 (deterioration
means a positive g0, although formally it may be negative if the environment
18Or an appropriate modelling option, since it suggests that a possible catastrophic change
of the system, in line with what many analysts of the climate problem believe
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improves). This means that the condition yt = y is replaced by y

t = ye
 g0t.
Proposition 10
- At the optimum, the private goods consumption grows asymptotically, what-
ever ; 0.
- The optimal asymptotic growth rate for the private good xt depends on 
and is given by the following formulae:
- If  < 1 then g1 = (r   )  g0(1  0)
- If  > 1 then g1 =
r 
0
19
- The asymptotic ecological discount rate, associated with the socially opti-
mal trajectory is B1 = limT!+1B
(T ) given by the following formulae20 :
- If  < 1 then B1 =    0g0.
- If  > 1 then B1 = (1  10 )r + 10    g
0
 .
Note that if one interprets  as a rate of survival of the planet, even a small
rate of decrease of the environmental quality (let us say smaller than this survival
rate if 0 > 1) would make the long run ecological discount rate negative, as
soon as  < 1. In the case  > 1, the ecological discount rate will be a¤ected
without being negative.
3.3 The dynamics of ecological discount rates
Here, we are focusing attention on the evolution of ecological discount rates with
time, and what can be called yield curves for ecological discount rates B(T ).
Since B(T ) = r  1 1T
PT 1
t=0 g

t , the dynamics of the ecological discount rate
is linked to the dynamics of growth. Indeed, the dynamics of optimal growth
can be assessed here.
Proposition 11 gt converges monotonically toward its limit according to the
following rules:
- If 0 > 1 (resp. 0 < 1) and  < 1 then gt is increasing (resp. decreasing)
- If 0 > 1 (resp. 0 < 1) and  > 1 then gt is decreasing (resp. increasing)..
- If  = 1 or 0 = 1 the optimal growth rate is constant.
Now using the formula B(T ) = r   1 1T
PT 1
t=0 g

t , we can deduce the shape
of the yield curve for ecological discount rate:
19The case  = 1 is specic and then g1 =
2(r )
1+0 .
20 If  = 1 then B1 =    1 
0
1+0 (r   ).
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Corollary 12 The shape of the yield curve is the following:
- If 0 > 1 (resp. 0 < 1) and  < 1 then T 7! B(T ) is decreasing (resp.
increasing) and converges towards .
- If 0 > 1 (resp. 0 < 1) and  > 1 then T 7! B(T ) is increasing (resp.
decreasing) and converges towards
 
1  10

r + 10 .
To illustrate our proposition, we drew yield curves using a simulation of the
growth path21 . Two examples, in the case 0 > 1 are given below where the
x-axis represents years and the y-axis the value of the ecological discount rate.
As it comes from the previous statements, in the rst case ( < 1 and
0 > 1), the yield curve is decreasing and converges towards .
In the second case ( > 1 and 0 > 1), the yield curve is increasing and
converges towards r   r 0 .
Figure 2: Yield curve example ( = 0:8, 0 = 1:5, r = 2%,  = 0:1%)
21We simply used a Newton-Raphson methodology to nd the growth path
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Figure 3: Yield curve example ( = 1:2, 0 = 1:5, r = 2%,  = 0:1%)
The diagrams suggest that ecological discount rates converge slowly to their
asymptotic value. Another interesting and related visual insight is that, when
 is low, the rate is low, but, even when  is high, because the curve is in-
creasing, the environmental rate is still low in the medium run. Hence, what
the diagrams show is that, for a time period between 1 and 3 centuries from
now, the disagreement between the moderate environmentalist and the radical
environmentalist is not huge: both have an ecological discount rate signicantly
below 1%; the rst one is between 0:6% and 0:65% and the second one is be-
tween 0:25% and 0:20%. Their willingness to pay, for let us say a generation
living at date 150 equals the discounted value, with the ecological discount rate,
respectively roughly 1=2 and 3=4, multiplied by their own marginal willingness
to pay, which itself depends on their wealth and on their ecologicalviews or
intuition. We investigate these points below.
3.4 Protable ecologicalinvestment, horizon and wealth
The ecological discount rate, as any commodity discount rate, tells us how to
compare the environmental benets to present generation and the environmental
benets to future generations. The marginal willingness to pay for one environ-
mental improvement, let us say a unit environmental improvement, at date T
is B(T ) (the ecological discount rate) multiplied by the present marginal will-
ingness to pay for the improvement, i.e. (x

0
y )
1=. We see that the willingness to
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pay is correlated with wealth (proportional to wealth when  = 1 and convex
or concave in wealth otherwise, depending on whether  is greater or smaller
than 1).
We are going to go further in the understanding of the e¤ect of wealth on
the propensity to invest in ecologicaldevices.
Let us then dene the ecological return of a unit cost initial investment
that has the unique e¤ect of triggering an improvement  of the ecological
quality at T, as  = e

(T )T : Such an investment is just protable socially if
e B
(T )T e

(T )T (
x0
y )
1= = 1, so that 
(T ) = B(T )  ( 1T )(1=) ln(x0=y).
Equivalently, using the ratio  of green GDP over standard GDP, we may
rewrite the formula: 
(T ) = B(T )  ( 1T )( 11  ) ln(0):
If we dene 
1 by limT!1

(T ) then:

1 = B

1
Hence 
(T ) is the ecological return of a just protable unitary initial
investment. Equivalently, it allows to express the relative price of the environ-
mental good at time T, in terms of the private good price at time 022 . With
this interpretation in mind, we construct the cut-o¤ ecological returncurves
T 7! 
(T ). We see that these curves di¤er from the ecological discount rate
curves by a term in 1=T , which depends on the wealth of the economy, and the
sign of which varies with this initial wealth.
Below, we have visualized several such yield curves that follow from the
combination of the wealth e¤ect with the e¤ects discussed above (depending on
 and 0).
The required return, in terms of environmental quality, of a one-unit in-
vestment is, in the long run, the same for a poor country and a rich country,
but the gures provide a striking illustration that, in the short run, a rich coun-
try can a¤ord negative such returns, (gure 4) when a poor country requires
positive and rather high such returns(gure 6).
22The standard discount rate allows to compare the relative price of the private good at
times T and 0, whereas the ecological discount rate allows to compare the relative price of the
environmental good at times T and 0.
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Figure 4: Yield Curve for 
 ( = 0:8, 0 = 1:5, r = 2%,  = 0:1%, y  x0)
Figure 5: Yield Curve for 
 ( = 0:8, 0 = 1:5, r = 2%,  = 0:1%, y ' x0)
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Figure 6: Yield Curve for 
 ( = 0:8, 0 = 1:5, r = 2%,  = 0:1%, y  x0)
4 Precaution
The precautionary principle refers to the desirable action to be taken in order
to avoid an "irreversible damage to the environment". We can examine the
question in our model. We rst consider the case where the "irreversible dam-
age to the environment" is imminent and well ascertained. However one of the
most popular statement of the precautionary principle stresses the uncertainty
surrounding the so called damage: "Where there are threats of serious or irre-
versible damage, lack of full scientic certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-e¤ective measures to prevent environmental degradation." The
question of the right intensity of action for implementing "cost-e¤ective mea-
sure" seems however to be left open. The present section indeed provides the
tools for implementing a cost-benet analysis of the desirability of precaution.
4.1 Valuing an irreversible damage to the environment.
The question we raise here is simple: consider a damage to the environment
that would take place today. In order to avoid this damage for itself, the present
generation is willing to pay x. How much should it be willing to pay if this
damage not only occurs now but is irreversible, i.e. if it deteriorates the well-
being of all future generations ? Let us call mx the willingness to pay for the
fact that the damage is irreversible, instead of x the price paid when the damage
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is temporary (one period23) and only concerns the present generation.
Avoiding the damage can then be viewed as providing kind of x ecological
perpetuities, the price of which is mx (this would be the price of x nancial
perpetuities, priced with a constant interest rate 1m )
We provide here lower bounds on m.
Theorem 13 Lets introduce a = max
 
; r(1  10 ) +  10

.
In the present deterministic context, if the initial generation is willing to pay x
in order to avoid a temporary (here one year) damage, it is willing to pay mx
to avoid making it irreversible, where the number m is greater than 1a
The rst remarkable feature of the theorem is that the lower bound to m,
is valid both for  > 1; and for  < 1. However, there are still two results
depending on 0 7 1. If 0 > 1 then, since  < r, a = r(1   10 ) +  10
whereas if 0 < 1 the result is simply that m  1 since a =  in this case.
It is also remarkable that m does not depend on initial wealth, although,
initial wealth determines x, and hence the to-day willingness to pay for avoiding
the considered damage.
Let us note that if the planner neglected the relative price e¤ect associated
with the increase in relative desirability of the environmental good, the discount
rate would be r andm would be approximately 1r (approximately because we use
an exponential discounting) as for a classical perpetuity. Hence, the introduction
of the environmental good can drastically change the willingness to pay of the
present generation for an environmental or ecological perpetuity that protects
all future generations from an irreversible damage. For instance, if we consider
that  ' 0, then m is, in our deterministic study with24 0 > 1, greater
than the "naive" assessment 1r , the multiplier being
1
1  1
0
. If you consider
the parameters values associated with the above graphs (0 = 1:5), instead of
having m ' 20 (resp. m ' 50) for r = 5% (resp. r = 2%), we get when  = 0:8;
m  6 20 = 120 (resp. m  300) and with  = 1:2, m  2:25 20 = 45 (resp.
m  112:5)
In order to get some idea on the quality of the bounds obtained in the above
theorem, we provide the computations of actualm, xing now the other common
parameters at y = 1, r = 3%,  = 1% and 0 = 1:5, in two cases that correspond
to  > 1 and  < 1.
Case 1 Case 2
 h = 1:2 l = 0:8
Theoretic inferior bound for m25 52.94 75
Actual m26 61.49 86.68
23All these reasonings can easily be adapted to settings in which the life duration of each
generation is T periods.
24The 0 < 1 case is still much more spectacular since, then, m  1

25 (1=(r(1  1
0 ) + 
1
0 ))
26This value is obtained with numerical simulations
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This numerical exercise suggests that the theoretical bounds provided by
Theorem 13 are fairly good approximations of the actual m.
Let us now consider the case where the irreversible damage will occur later
in period  , possibly far away from now.
Again, the above question is meaningful, although m is no longer a priori
necessarily greater than one.
Proposition 14 m > e a 1a
The proposition stresses that, as suggested above, a may be viewed as an
upper bound for the discount rate to be used for evaluating "ecological perpe-
tuities" but also "ecological forward perpetuities".
5 Tackling the uncertainty about the elasticity
of substitution :
The relative long run merits of articial goods vis à vis global environmental
quality, that we have stressed in a somewhat caricatural way, can hardly be
decided today on an objective basis. We have to accept the fact that there may
be an irreducible uncertainty lying behind our today choices, and if we stick
to our modelling option, an uncertainty that bears on the value of elasticity
of substitution27 . Furthermore, if we do not want to dismiss completely the
long run the evaluation of changes in environmental quality associated with the
radical and the moderate environmentalist, we have to take a support for ,
going from a value smaller than one to another larger than one.
In the logic of our model, an initial uncertainty on  might be resolved,
either immediately or with a more realistic procedure, that only allows a noisy
assessment of past welfare, progressively through time.
In fact we will somewhat simplify our approach of learning by assuming that
the uncertainty remains unresolved until it is completely resolved at some period
 . In the next subsection, we stress a scenario that makes such an assumption
plausible.
5.1 Optimization when the uncertainty is resolved at some
date  > 0.
As suggested above, let us assume that  2 fl; hg, where l < 1 < h is
learnt instantaneously at a time  > 0. The optimization of growth obtain from
the solution of the following program:
 1X
t=0
e t[pV (l;xt; y) + (1  p)V (h;xt; y)] + pU( ; l) + (1  p)U( ; h)
27 In particular, in our framework, the uncertainty of the threats associated with climate
change, as described by climatologists, has to be reected as an uncertainty on :
23
s:t: 0 given t+1 = e
r[t + wt   xt]
where
U(; ) =Max(xt;yt)t
1X
t=
e tV (;xt; yt)
is the Bellman function associated with the non-random problem after we
learnt . At this time, the deterministic results provide the required informa-
tion, given that the initial condition which is the remaining wealth  .
After  has been elicited, the two trajectories xlt and x
h
t which are identical
for t <  , diverge: if it is equal to l the asymptotic growth rate of xt = x
l
t is
g1 = l(r   ) and if  is equal to h the asymptotic growth rate of xt = xht
is g1 =
r 
0 . Ecological discount rates can then be assessed in the long run.
The next propositions stress that the possibility that  < 1 should be
weighted signicantly in our present decisions, even if it is unlikely: we can
view it as a weak form of the precautionary principle
Proposition 15 (Weak Precautionary Principle).Viewed from time zero
the asymptotic ecological discount rate B1 does not depend on p > 0 and is equal
to B1 = min

; 1h0  +

1  1h0

r

=
(
; if h0 > 1
1
h0
 +

1  1h0

r; if h0 < 1
Uncertainty leads to consider asymptotically the smallest possible ecological
rate. This is the counterpart for the "ecological discount rate" of the limit
behavior of discount rates, stressed by Weitzman (2001). This is however a
weak precautionary principle, in the sense that it suggests to put emphasis on
the long run bad situations even if uncertain ("lack of full scientic certainty").
However, the operational value of the present version of the principle for cost-
benet analysis is unclear: how long is the long run ? Next Section provides an
operational precautionary principle.
6 Precaution when the harmfulness of the irre-
versible damage is uncertain.
In the present framework, we focus attention on an irreversible damage, that will
take place in the future, and whose harmfulness is now unclear but will be fully
revealed at the date at which the damage will occur. Formally, we still assume
that the uncertainty bears on : as above, in the rst periods, this uncertainty
is not resolved:  can take two values h; l; h > 1 > l: The two values
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reect the a priori viewpoints of what we have called the moderate and the
radical environmentalist. At time  ; an irreversible damage to the environment
will take place (it consists here, of a small decrease of y)28 and the social cost
of the damage will be revealed, i.e. the true value of  will be known. In a
sense, the occurrence of the environmental "accident" at time  ; provides an
experiment that allows to assess exactly the value of : The fact that nothing
will be learnt between now and  , remains extreme, and it would make sense
to let at least a small part of the information be discovered before  ; but the
assumption simplies the analysis, without changing it in a basic way.
The question we are raising is similar to the one we have raised in a deter-
ministic context: how much is the present generation willing to pay in order
to avoid the just described irreversible damage to the environment, that would
take place at time  ? (so that it would concern all generations after ). However
if the nature of the damage associated with the event is well ascertained to-day,
its harmfulness is not. Again, the present generation is supposed to be willing
to pay x, at date 0, (it is the year willingness to pay) so far as it is concerned,
in order to avoid this damage for itself, (a willingness to pay that reects its
own uncertainty of ): As above in Proposition 14, we want to provide here
a lower bound of the number mx that represents the total willingness to pay
under scrutiny (m is no longer necessarily greater than one). Here this number
has to depend on the "ecological discount rate" between 0 and  , the period at
which the "irreversible ecological accident" occurs, the exact value of which is
closely related with the characteristics of the optimum considered in Section 4.
We limit the analysis to the case where29 h0 > 1:
Theorem 16 (Strong Precautionary Principle) Let us assume h0 >
1: Lets introduce, as in the deterministic case, a(h) = r(1   1h0 ) +  1h0
and a(l) = max

; r(1  1l0 ) +  1l0

.
In the random case, if p lies in (0; 1), we have:
m > e B
()

1
a(l)

pN()
pN() + (1  p)

+
1
a(h)

(1  p)
pN() + (1  p)

Where N() grows exponentially with  .
More precisely, if l0 > 1, then:
m > e B
()
264 1r(1  1l0 )+ 1l0

pN()
pN()+(1 p)

+ 1
r(1  1
h
0 )+ 1h0

(1 p)
pN()+(1 p)

375
28This introduces a minor di¤erence with the model analyzed in the previous sub-section.
As the reader will check, the envelope theorem makes this di¤erence irrelevant for the analysis.
29Which is true whenever 0 > 1. But as mentioned earlier, 0 can only be slightly smaller
than 1, if it be, especially when  is small.
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and if l0 < 1, then:
m > e B
()
24 1

pN()
pN()+(1 p)

+ 1
r(1  1
h
0 )+ 1h0

(1 p)
pN()+(1 p)
 35
The lower bound we obtain here for m has a simple interpretation: it is the
discounted value, with the ecological discount rate, of the expectation of the
deterministic lower bounds stressed in Theorem 13, expectation measured with
distorted probabilities. Indeed, the probability to attribute to the bad case with
respect to the good case has to be severely distorted : the later the date, the
more weight we put on the bad case, the weight becoming closer to its limit 1,
counteracting the (weak) tendency of the (ecological) discount rate to dismiss
precaution for late damages. Scientic uncertainty, here on , has a lot of bite
on the cost of irreversible damage to the environment. As we shall see later the
bounds stressed here depend on some endogenous variables, on which further
information may be obtained (for example, one has relevant information on the
growth rate g() governing the growth of N()). We come back to this point
after stating a corollary which reassesses the precautionary e¤ect in a di¤erent
way.
Corollary 17 (Precautionary Principle, Strong version). There exists a
function (p; ) 7! (p; ) verifying:
(0; ) =
1
a(h)
(1; ) =
1
a(l)
and
lim
!+1(p; ) =
1
a(l)
;8p > 0
such that:
m > e B
() [(p; )]
Hence, 8p, if  is large enough,
m > e B
() 1
a(l)
If30 l0 > 1 then  can be chosen (as in Theorem 16) so that the graph lies
above its chord [(0; 1a(l) ); (1;
1
a(h) )].
The above formulae provide a lot of information on the bounds on m that
do encompass the information obtained in the deterministic case. However the
bounds we nd here do not only depend, as in the deterministic case, on the
four basic parameters of the models, but also on the characteristics of the initial
30 In fact this may be true for l0 < 1 but only if the initial wealth 0 is high enough or if
 is large enough to guarantee the inequality N() > 1
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situation, through N().
Although an exact solution of the optimization program is untractable an-
alytically, the random case for all ps can easily be solved numerically. We
illustrate our results from a problem in which, before time  = 100 ( is re-
vealed at this time), the agent hesitates between h = 1:2 and l = 0:8 and we
attribute probabilities 1   p and p to these two cases. In this situation, with
r = 3%;  = 1%; 0 = 1; 5) we can nd numerically the ecological discount rates
and compute m for any possible p in [0; 1].
This is what we did for chosen ps and the graphical result is the following:
This diagram illustrates in a spectacular way our qualitative statement about
p 7! (p; ) being above its chord: the function p 7! m(p) is concave and quickly
increasing. Hence, even for small p strictly greater than 0,m is far fromm(p = 0)
and close to m(p = 1). This is a clear form of precautionary principle. If we
do not know whether or not climate issues will lead to real problems in the
future, here at date 100; we need to act nearly as if we were sure that the bad
case would happen and additionally, as suggested by the general form of the
principle, the discount rate to be used does not crash the future concern.
Conclusion.
The paper proposes a simple model for discussing the long run issues associated
with environmental quality. The model describes a four parameter world, that
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respectively reect ecological concern, resistance to intertemporal substitution,
intergenerational altruism and feasibility constraints. These parameters are sup-
posed to remain constant through time, an assumption which makes the model
tractable and simple, although it is certainly too extreme31 .
The paper shows that long run environmental policies are crucially a¤ected
by the ecological view, in particular but not only, if the radical viewpoint is
adopted. Also, the paper shows that the radical viewpoint on environment, even
when it is unlikely to be true, has however bite on the determination of present
policies, a fact that may be viewed as supporting some form of a precautionary
principle. In a companion paper, (work in progress) we will provide back of
the envelope computations based on an adaptation of the present model to
the global warming issue that suggesting an upward re-evaluation of the Stern
estimates of the merits of action.
Let us repeat that our simple setting allows to focus both on the relative
price e¤ect and on the uncertainty dimension of the economic appraisal of eco-
logical intuition. To put it in a nutshell, the paper stresses that the economic
argument, along which we should not sacrice the present generationswelfare
to the welfare of our descendants that will be wealthier than us, is valid here,
but has to be strongly qualied. There is a most valuable gift that is worth
transmitting to our descendants, because it may be very important for them,
although this is not sure, it is a good environment.
Appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposition 3:
The implicit discount rate rt for private goods between periods t and t+ 1
is uniquely dened by:
e r

t = e 
@1V (x

t+1; y)
@1V (xt ; y)
= e 

xt+1
xt
  1  xt+1  1 + y  1
xt
 1
 + y
 1

! 1 0
 1
Taking logarithms, this gives:
rt =  + g

t =  
1  0
   1 ln
 
xt+1
 1
 + y
 1

xt
 1
 + y
 1

!
rt =  + g

t =  
1  0
   1 ln
 
1 + t+1
 1
1 + t
 1
!
rt =  + g

t = +
1  0
   1 ln
 
1 + t
 1
1 + t+1
 1
!
31A forthcoming paper proposes a ve parameter description of the world that allow to
disentangle fully optimal and second best investment policies.
28
This is the second formula of Proposition 3. The rst formula can be ob-
tained by the same reasoning if we go back to:
rt =  + g

t =  
1  0
   1 ln
 
xt+1
 1
 + y
 1

xt
 1
 + y
 1

!
rt =  + g

t =  
1  0
   1 ln
2664xt+1xt
 1
 1 +

y
xt+1
 1

1 +

y
xt
 1

3775
rt =  + g

t =  
1  0
   1
   1

gt  
1  0
   1 ln

1 + t+1
1 + t

rt =  + g

t 
0 +
1  0
   1 ln

1 + t
1 + t+1

This formulation will be useful when  > 1 whereas the other one will be
useful for  < 1.
For the ecological discount rate, e 

t = e  (@2V )t+1(@2V )t = e
  (@1V )t+1
(@1V )t

xt+1
xt
1=
=
e r

t eg

t =
Hence, t = r

t   gt = and this proves Proposition 3.
Proof of Corollary 4:
Let us linearize the rst formula of Proposition 3.
rt =  + g

t 
0 +
1  0
   1 ln

1 + t
1 + t+1

rt =  + g

t 
0 +
1  0
   1 ln

1 + t
1 + t exp(gt
1 
 )

rt '  + gt 0 +
1  0
   1 ln

1 + t
1 + t + t gt
1 
 )

rt '  + gt 0  
1  0
   1
t
1 + t
gt
1  

rt '  + gt (0 + (
1

  0) 

t
1 + t
)
Proof of Corollary 5:
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Lets consider the formula of Proposition 3:
rt =  + g

t 
0 +
1  0
   1 ln

1 + t
1 + t+1

Since, in the case under scrutiny32 , i.e. 0 > 1, we have that 1 
0
 1 has the
same sign as 1   we basically need to prove that t 7! 1+t1+t+1 is decreasing.
This is true if and only if:
1 + t
1 + t+1
 1 + 

t+1
1 + t+2
() (1 + t )(1 + t+2)  (1 + t+1)2
() t + t+2  2t+1
() 1 + exp(2(1  

)g)  2 exp((1  

)g)
() exp((
1 
 )g) + exp( ( 1  )g)
2
 1
and this is always true.
Proof of Corollary 6:
We have the formula of Proposition 3:
rt =  + g

t 
0 +
1  0
   1 ln

1 + t
1 + t+1

We note that when  is greater than one, as soon as gt has a lower bound
strictly greater than zero, t tends to zero.In this case, it is straightforward to
see that:
rt !  + gt 0
Its now easy to conclude that R(T )!  + g0 using Césàros theorem.
For the long run ecological discount rate, we use Proposition 3 to conclude
that B(T ) R(T )! g= and this leads to the result:
B(T )!  + g(0   1=)
In the  < 1 case we come back to the other part of Proposition 3:
rt =  + g

t = +
1  0
   1 ln
 
1 + t
 1
1 + t+1
 1
!
32The reasoning is similar for 0 < 1.
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Here, however, in the long run, t ! +1 so that we have directly:
rt !  + g=
Using Césàros theorem we get R(T ) !  + g= and with the help of
Proposition 3 we have the result on B that is B(T )! 
Proof of Proposition 7:
This is a clear consequence of the formula t = r

t   gt =t. We just need to
apply Césàros theorem.
Proof of Proposition 8:
We consider the Lagrangian of the problem:
L =
1X
t=0
exp( t)[V (xt; yt) + t(er[t + wt   xt]  t+1) + t(y   yt)]
The rst order conditions are the following:8<: @xtL = 0 () @xV (x

t ; y

t ) = e
rt
@t+1L = 0 () t+1 exp(r   ) = t
@ytL = 0 () @yV (xt ; yt ) = t
The rst thing to note is that yt = y.
Then, since we supposed that r is greater than  we have exp(r   ) > 1 so
that t and @xV (xt ; y) are both decreasing and tend to zero. The natural con-
sequence is that the consumption of the private good xt grows and tends to +1.
The growth path xt is then characterized by:
@xV (x

t ; y) = e
rt =
0e
r
exp((r   )t)
Therefore,
xt
  1
h
xt
 1
 + y
 1

i 1 0
 1
=
0e
r
exp((r   )t)
As we did in the preceding parts we are going to consider two cases depending
on  being larger or smaller than 1.
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 The  > 1 case:
xt
 0 1 0e
r
exp((r   )t)
ln(
xt+1
xt
) 1 r   
0
Hence, the asymptotic growth rate is the same as if there were no consid-
eration of the environmental good:
g1 =
r   
0
 The  < 1 case:
xt
  1 1 0e
r
y
1
 0 exp((r   )t)
ln(
xt+1
xt
) 1 (r   )
Hence, the growth rate in that case is given by:
g1 = (r   )
The results on the ecological discount rate then follow from Corollary 6.
As before, it is also possible to consider  = 1 by taking a Cobb-Douglas
function for V : V (xt; yt) =
(xtyt)
1 0
2
1 0 and we eventually obtain g

1 =
2(r )
1+0
and hence the result for the ecological discount rate.
Proofs of Proposition 9 and Corollary 10: (These proofs can be omitted
at rst reading33)
For the 0 part of Proposition 10, there is nothing to do since the optimiza-
tion problem is continuous.
To prove Corollary 11, the rst thing to do is to write the result of Propo-
sition 3 and to deduce a useful expression for B(T ).
We have:
t = r  
gt

33 Its very important here to consider v(x; y) =
h
1
2
x
 1
 + 1
2
y
 1

i 
 1 with the weights
1
2
to extend the function properly and also to remind that V = v
1 0 1
1 0 . Obviously, it
doesnt change anything to our preceding results since these changes only consist in additive
or multiplicative scalar adjustment
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) B(T ) = r   1

1
T
T 1X
t=0
gt
) B(T ) = r   1

1
T
ln

xT
x0

Therefore, the only thing to prove is that 8t; xt is a continuous function of
 (this is Proposition 10). But we know that the growth path is dened by the
rst order condition @xV (xt ;) =
0e
r
exp((r )t) where we omitted the reference to
y here since we focus on . Then it is easy to see that the only two things we
need to prove are:
 The Lagrange multiplier 0 is a continuous function of .
 The function g(; ) implicitly dened by @1V (g(; );) =  is continu-
ous.
The second point is easy. Notice rst that the function (x; ) 7! V (x;) can
be extended to a C2 function (the proof is easy). Then, by the implicit function
theorem, g(; ) is a C1 function ((; ) 2 (R+)2).
Therefore, the only thing to prove is that the rst Lagrange multiplier 0 is
a continuous function of . Let us recall that 0 is dened by the resources
constraint:
1X
t=0
xt e
 rt = 0 +
1X
t=0
wte
 rt(:= 134)
1X
t=0
g(0e
r exp((   r)t); )e rt = 1
Here, we cannot apply directly the implicit function theorem to the left
hand side. However, if we consider the restricted optimization problem with a
xed time horizon T 35 then the associated Lagrange multiplier (T0 ) is implicitly
dened by
TX
t=0
g(T0 exp((   r)t); )e rt = 0 +
TX
t=0
wte
 rt(:= T )
and the implicit function theorem applies: T0 is a C
1 function of .
Now, we can approximate 0 by 
T
0 and this gives:
j0()  0(~)j  j0()  T0 ()j+ jT0 ()  T0 (~)j+ jT0 (~)  0(~)j.
Hence, we see that the only thing to prove is a pointwise convergence in the sense
that, for  xed, we have a convergence of T0 () towards 0() as T !1.
34This quantity is supposed nite for the problem to have a solution.
35Max
PT
t=0 exp( t)u(xt; y) s.t. t+1 = er[t + wt   xt]
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To prove that lets introduce FT : z 7!
PT
t=0 g(ze
r exp((   r)t); )e rt and
similarly F : z 7! P1t=0 g(zer exp((   r)t); )e rt. These two functions are
positive and decreasing because g is a positive and decreasing function of .
Moreover, FT is continuous and there is a pointwise convergence of FT towards
F . By monotony, FT converges towards F uniformly on every compact set and
therefore, F is a continuous function and so is the inverse of the function F .
By the second Dinis theorem then, the inverse of the function FT converges
uniformly on every compact set towards the inverse of the function F .
But T0   0 = F 1T (T )   F 1(1) and hence, since T ! 1, we are done
with the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11:
One can easily see that the rst formula of Proposition 3 is still valid. Hence,
we have:
r =  + gt 
0 +
1  0
   1 ln

1 + t
1 + t+1

Since t =

x0
y
 1
 1
exp
 
( 1   1)(gt + g0)

, the results for g1 are straight-
forward and follow from the same reasoning as in Proposition 3.
Now, for the ecological rate t , the last formula of Proposition 3 is changed
and we get from the same trick as in Proposition 3:
t = r

t   (gt + g0)=
This new formula leads to the results for B(T ).
Proof of Proposition 12:
Let us go back the rst order conditions that dene the growth path.
We have:
@xV (x

t ; y) = e
r @xV (xt e
gt ; y)
Therefore, g, as a function of x is dened implicitly by (we now omit the y
terms):
V 0(x) exp(r   ) =V 0

xeg(x)

If  = 1, we are dealing with Cobb-Douglas functions and then the growth
rate is clearly independent of x and the result is proved.
Otherwise, since xt is an increasing sequence, the variation properties of g

t
are given by the sign of g0(x) that is going to be computed now.
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Taking logs and deriving we get:
V 00(x)
V 0(x)
=
V 00(xeg(x))
V 0(xeg(x))
eg(x)(1 + g0(x)x)
Hence, the sign of g0(x) is the sign of V 0(x)V 00(xeg(x))eg(x) V 0(xeg(x))V 00(x).
This sign is simply the sign of ddx
V 0(xeg)
V 0(x) where g is now an independent
variable.
The latter expression can be written as:
e g=
d
dx
"
y + (xeg)

 1
y + x

 1
# 1 0
 1
The sign of this derivative is the sign of:
1  0
   1
   1


eg
 1
   1

=
1  0


eg
 1
   1

Since g > 0 in our context, this expression has the same sign as the product
(1  0)(   1) and this proves our result.
Proof of Theorem 13:
By denition, m is equal to
P1
T=0 exp( B(T )T ).
Since we want to nd a lower bound for m, we need to nd an upper bound for
B(T ).
The ecological rate B(T ) can be written
B(T ) = r   1
T
T 1X
t=0
gt
Hence, the problem boils down to nd a lower bound for gt .
Now, from Proposition 3, we know that a lower bound to gt is
r 
0 when
0 > 1 or (r   ) when 0 < 1 .
Hence, in general, gt  min
 
r 
0 ; (r   )

and henceB(T )  r min   r 0 ; r    =
a.
This gives:
m =
1X
T=0
exp( B(T )T ) 
1X
T=0
exp( aT )
=
1
1  exp ( a) 
1
a
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Proof of Proposition 14:
By denition, m is now equal to:
1X
T=
exp( B(T )T )
Using the same inequality as before, we have:
m 
1X
T=
exp( aT )
=
exp( a)
1  exp( a)  e
 a 1
a
Proof of Proposition 15:
Lets consider T >  and lets recall rst the denition of B(T ) in this
context:
B(T ) =    1
T
ln

p@yV (l;x
l
T ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xhT ; y)
p@yV (l;xl0 ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xh0 ; y)

To prove our result, in the case where h0 > 1, it is su¢ cient to prove that
the expression in the logarithm remains bounded as T increases. Hence, we are
going to prove that the following expression is bounded:
py
  1l

xlT
l 1
l + y
l 1
l
 1 l0
l 1
+ (1  p)y  1h

xhT
h 1
h + y
h 1
h
 1 h0
h 1
The rst part of the expression converges toward py 
0
and is therefore
bounded.
For the second part of the expression, xhT
h 1
h + y
h 1
h ! 1 so that, since
1 h0
h 1 < 0 (we are in the h
0 > 1 case), the second part of the expression
tends toward 0 and this proves the result.
To prove the result when h0 < 1, we see that the only change is the behav-
ior of the second part of the above expression and, now

xhT
h 1
h + y
h 1
h
 1 h0
h 1
goes to innity at exponential speed, as e(
r 
0
h 1
h
1 h0
h 1 .
Hence, B(T )!    (r   ) 1 h0h0 , and this is our result.
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Proof of Theorem 16:
For T   , we have, by denition:
exp ( B(T )T ) = exp ( T )

p@yV (l;x
l
T ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xhT ; y)
p@yV (l;x0; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;x0; y)

We are going to separate the reasoning into two parts to factorize what
happens after time  on the two di¤erent trajectories. exp ( B(T )T ) is equal
to:
pe (T )

@yV (l;x
l
T ; y)
@yV (l;xl ; y)

 e 

@yV (l;x
l
 ; y)
p@yV (l;x0; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;x0; y)

+(1 p)e (T )

@yV (h;x
h
T ; y)
@yV (h;xh ; y)

e 

@yV (h;x
h
 ; y)
p@yV (l;x0; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;x0; y)

The terms e (T )
h
@yV (l;x
l
T ;y)
@yV (l;xl ;y)
i
and e (T )
h
(1  p)@yV (h;xhT ;y)
@yV (h;xh ;y)
i
can
easily be controlled using what we know from the deterministic cases : they are
respectively greater than e a(l)(T ) and e a(h)(T ).
The other terms correspond to what happens before time  and we would
like to link them to the ecological discount rate B().
Lets take rst the term corresponding to the l-trajectory:
e 

@yV (l;x
l
 ; y)
p@yV (l;x0; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;x0; y)

= e 

p@yV (l;x
l
 ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xh ; y)
p@yV (l;x0; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;x0; y)



@yV (l;x
l
 ; y)
p@yV (l;xl ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xh ; y)

= e B
()

@yV (l;x
l
 ; y)
p@yV (l;xl ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xh ; y)

= e B
()
@yV (l;x
l
 ;y)
@yV (h;xh ;y)
p
@yV (l;xl ;y)
@yV (h;xh ;y)
+ (1  p)
Now, lets turn to the term corresponding to the h-trajectory:
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e 

@yV (h;x
h
 ; y)
p@yV (l;x0; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;x0; y)

=

@yV (h;x
h
 ; y)
p@yV (l;xl ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xh ; y)

e 

p@yV (l;x
l
 ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xh ; y)
p@yV (l;x0; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;x0; y)

=

@yV (h;x
h
 ; y)
p@yV (l;xl ; y) + (1  p)@yV (h;xh ; y)

 e B()
= e B
() 1
p
@yV (l;xl ;y)
@yV (h;xh ;y)
+ (1  p)
Now, if we compile all the inequalities, we obtain:
e B
(T )T > e B
()

pe a(l)(T )

N()
pN() + (1  p)

+ (1  p)e a(h)(T )( 1
pN() + (1  p) )

where N() stands for @yV (l;x
l
 ;y)
@yV (h;xh ;y)
If we sum everything, we get:
m > e B
()

p
1
a(l)

N()
pN() + (1  p)

+ (1  p) 1
a(h)

1
pN() + (1  p)

We see that one thing remains to be done: studying N().
We can write:
N() =
@yV (l;x
l
 ; y)
@yV (h;xh ; y)
=
24y  1l xl l 1l + y l 1l  1 l
0
l 1
35 =
24y  1h xh h 1h + y h 1h  1 h
0
h 1
35
=
2664y 0
241 + xl
y
l 1
l
35
1 l0
l 1
3775 =
2664y 0
241 + xh
y
h 1
h
35
1 h0
h 1
3775
=
241 + xl
y
l 1
l
35
1 l0
l 1
=
241 + xh
y
h 1
h
35
1 h0
h 1
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Its clear that this expression grows exponentially for h0 > 1.
If we also have that l0 > 1, then this expression is always greater than 1
because we divide a term greater than 1 by a term smaller than 1.
Proof of Corollary 17:
From the Theorem 16, we see that the natural candidate for  is:
(p; ) = p
1
a(l)

N()
pN() + (1  p)

+ (1  p) 1
a(h)

1
pN() + (1  p)

Clearly, the only thing that needs to be clarify is the fact that  lies above
its chord, that is:
(p; )  p 1
a(l)
+ (1  p) 1
a(h)
This is guaranteed if N() is greater than one, which is always true36 when-
ever l0 > 1.
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